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UPDATE
REORIENTING BAYH-DOLE'S MARCH-IN:
LOOKING TO PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES
IN THE PUBLIC'S INTEREST
BY ABIGAIL AMATO RIVES

In light of developments since publication, this addendum updates

the article Reorienting Bayh-Dole's March-In: Looking to Purpose
and Objectives in the Public's Interest.' In that article, the author
suggested practical changes to the implementation of the Bayh-Dole

Act which would allow the government to address public health
concerns regarding access to federally funded medical technologies.2
This addendum describes the outcome of a recent agency decision
under the Bayh-Dole Act. This recent development does not alter the
author's previous argument. However, in light of recent agency
action, it seems that Congressional intervention or new regulations
developed by the Department of Commerce will be necessary to
implement the author's suggestion.
On October 25, 2012, four non-profit organizations petitioned the
National Institutes of Health ("NIH"), requesting that the agency
march-in on six of Abbott's patents relating to the drug ritonavir
(brand name "Norvir").' The four non-profits involved felt that the

1. Abigail Amato Rives, Reorienting Bayh-Dole's March-In: Looking to Purpose
and Objectives in the Public'sInterest, 5 AM. U. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 77 (2013).
2. Id.
3. KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, REQUEST FOR MARCH-IN ON ABBOTT
PATENTS FOR RITONAVIR ON GROUNDS THAT ABBOTT PRIVATE SECTOR PRICES FOR
RITONAVIR ARE HIGHER THAN IN OTHER HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES AND ABBOTT'S

REFULSAL TO LICENSE PATENTS FOR NON-ABBOTT FIXED DOSE COMBINATIONS OF H1V
DRUGS 3 [hereinafter NORVIR PETITION 2012] (Oct. 25, 2012), available at

http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/2012-Oct25-Ritionavimiiarch
nt.pdf.

in complai
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price of Norvir is (still) too high in the United States-especially
when compared to the price in other high-income countries-and
that Abbott's refusal to license the patents was detrimental to both
individual patients and public health.4 This petition also asked the
NIH to implement new policies which would allow the agency to
leverage the power of the purse, to the extent possible, to control
high drug prices.5 After over a year of deliberations, the NIH denied
the march-in request.' This was the second such request made, and
denied, regarding ritonavir. 7
These organizations were seeking to use the unique statutory
mechanism of "march-in."' As a reminder, the Bayh-Dole Act allows
research institutions to patent inventions that arise from federally
funded research. 9 Through the Act, the government retains the right
1
to "march-in.""
This means that the government can issue licenses
for the patented technology if patent-holders are not taking
reasonable steps to realize the public benefit of the federally funded
research." In theory at least, march-in would increase competition
(including generic competition in the pharmaceutical market), lower
prices, and allow follow-on innovation. 2
The NIH has received five petitions asking it to march-in,13 and
each time the agency has declined.1
It has used the exact same
reasoning in responding to all five petitions.15 The NIH engages in a
rigid interpretation of the march-in provision;" only considering

4.

NoRVIR PETITION 2012, supra note

5.
6.

NORVIR PETITION 2012, supIa note 47, at 2-3.

47, at 3-4.

NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR DETERMINATION IN

THE CASE OF NORVIR® MANUFACTURED BY ABBVIE 1 (Nov.
DETERMINATION],
available

1, 2013) [hereinafter NIH

at
http://,A Aww.ott.nih.gov/sites/defiault/files/documents/policy/March-InNorvir2013.pdf.
7. See ESSENTIAL INVENTIONS, INC., PETITION TO USE AUTHORITY UNDER BAYHDOLE

ACT

TO PROMOTE ACCESS TO RITONAVIR, SUPPORTED BY NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF

A127220 (Jan. 29 2004) [hereinafter
available
at
http://www.essentialinventions.oig/legal/noivir/norvii-29jan04petition.pdf.
8. 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2012).
ALLERGY AND INFECTIONS DISEASES CONTRACT No.

NORVIR

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

PETITION

2004],

Id. § 202.
Id. § 203.
Id.
Rives, supra note 1, at 80.
Id. at 81.

14. Id.; NIH DETERMINATION, supra note 50.
15. Rives, supra note 1, at 88.
16. Id. at 88. In the 2012 request, petitioners also requested march-in under 35
U.S.C. § 203(a) (3). That provision of the statute deals with actions that are necessary
to comply with other Federal regulations. The NIH rejected that argument because
neither the Americans with Disabilities Act nor the Patient Protection and Affordable
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whether patent-holders are taking effective steps to achieve practical
application of an invention 7 and whether march-in would relieve
unfulfilled health and safety needs. 8 If a drug is on the market, with
FDA approval, and being manufactured, that satisfies the "practical
application" element of the statute.
Similarly, if a drug is FDA
approved, and being prescribed to treat patients, that satisfies the
"health and safety needs" element of the statute.20
In its most recent determination, the NIH rejected the claims (1)
that Abbott failed to achieve practical application of Norvir and (2)
that Abbott was failing to satisfy health and safety needs.2 ' Norvir is
an FDA-approved drug, it is co-administered with other marketed
drugs, and there is no evidence that it is in short supply.22 There are

even Norvir-containing drugs provided through the President's
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief ("PEPFAR") and similar drugs in the
pipeline. 23 This "record of manufacture and ritonavir's availability
and use around the world demonstrate[d]" to NIH that Abbott was
achieving practical application of the invention. 4 Regarding health
and safety needs, this same evidence indicates that Abbott is meeting
the demand for Norvir. 25 The price of the drug is not increasing, and
there are patient assistant programs through which low-income
patients can access Norvir. 2) No information was provided to suggest
Abbott "has failed to 'reasonably satisfy' the health and safety need
27
standard of the Bayh-Dole march-in statute.
In the earlier article, the author suggested that the government
should consider the purpose and objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act, and
give weight to the public's interest, when making a march-in
decision. 2 Congress included march-in in the Bayh-Dole Act as a
safety valve to protect the public interest.23 Importantly, march-in was
intended to combat misuse of federally funded inventions where a
patent-holder was using a technology in a way that was antithetical to
Care Act require the use of Ritonavir. NIH DETERMINATION, supra note 50, at 5.
Analysis of this provision is outside the scope of this paper.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1) (2012).
18. Id. § 203(a) (2).
19. See, e.g., NIH DETERMINATION, supra note 50, at 4.
20. See, e.g., NIH DETERMINATION, supra note 50, at 4-5.
21. NIH DETERMINATION, supra note 50, at 4.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.

24. Id.
25.

Id.

26. Id.
27. Id. at 5.
28.

Rives, supra note 1, at 77-78.

29. Id. at 81.
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public benefits.
For example, there is evidence that Abbott
increased the price of Norvir to preserve the position of another
product in the market.31 The company sought to limit use of Norvir
and thereby increase use of another product-which is directly
2
opposed to the goals of the Bayh-Dole Act.1
The author suggested that federal research funding agencies, such
as the NIH, should consider two additional factors when weighing a
march-in decision: (1) are patent-holders acting consistent with the
purposes and objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act and (2) would march-in
promote the public interest?"
If patent holders are not acting
consistent with the purposes of Bayh-Dole, this would indicate that
march-in is appropriate.
If march-in would not serve a public
interest, then march-in is probably not appropriate. The author also
described three possible avenues for implementing this new
approach. NIH could issue interpretive guidance elaborating a new
march-in approach; 4 the Department of Commerce could revise its
regulations implementing Bayh-Dolet;5 or Congress could amend the
Act to announce this shift in march-in.}
The NIH could, and still can, incorporate the Act's purpose and
objectives into future march-in decisions. 7 However, especially based
on the recent NIH determination, it seems clear that the agency will
continue to apply the same decision-making framework)8 There are
benefits to agency consistency; the community will know what to
expect from the agency when it makes future march-in
determinations. 39
Furthermore, courts tend to reward agency
0
consistency.' The NIH would not want to have its march-in decision
overturned on judicial review, which makes it harder to deviate from
its previous decisions.
Therefore, if the government wants to adopt the author's
suggested march-in approach, Congress or the Department of
Commerce will have to act. The Department of Commerce should
revise the regulations implementing Bayh-Dole, reemphasizing that
agencies ought to consider the purpose and objectives of the Act
30. Id. at 77-78.
31. Id. at 80.
32. Id. at 112-13.
33. Id. at 101.
34. Id. at 106.
35. Id. at 110.
36. Id. at lll.
37. Id. at 106.
38. See, e.g., NIH
39.
40.

DETERMINATION, supra note 50.
See Rives, supra note 1, at 107-8.
See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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when deciding whether to initiate march-in proceedings.
Congressional amendment of the Bayh-Dole Act would be the most
decisive way to reorient the march-in provision." Congress can send
a clear signal to agencies like the NIH that march-in decisions should
be made in the context of Bayh-Dole's broader objective to promote
the public's interests.4"
So far, the march-in provision has failed to be an effective safety
valve inthe overall Bayh-Dole framework. It was intended to deter or
correct misuse of federally funded technologies." The recent NIH
determination regarding ritonavir signals that the agency will not
shift the march-in process. This reemphasizes the argument from the
earlier paper and suggests we need to look to Congress or the
Department of Commerce to reorient the march-in provision and
ensure there is a viable safety valve in the Bayh-Dole Act to protect
the public's interest. 5
In that article, the author suggested practical changes to the
implementation of the Bayh-Dole Act which would allow the
government to address public health concerns regarding access to
federally funded medical technologies. 6 This addendum describes
the outcome of a recent agency decision under the Bayh-Dole Act.
This recent development does not alter the author's previous
argument. However, in light of recent agency action, it seems that
Congressional intervention or new regulations developed by the
Department of Commerce will be necessary to implement the
author's suggestion.
On October 25, 2012, four non-profit organizations petitioned the
National Institutes of Health ("NIH"), requesting that the agency
march-in on six of Abbott's patents relating to the drug ritonavir
(brand name "Norvir") .7 The four non-profits involved felt that the
price of Norvir is (still) too high in the United States-especially
when compared to the price in other high-income countries-and
that Abbott's refusal to license the patents was detrimental to both
individual patients and public health. 8 This petition also asked the
NIH to implement new policies which would allow the agency to
leverage the power of the purse, to the extent possible, to control
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Rives, supIa note 1, at 110.
Id.at Ill.
Id.
Id. at 86-87.
Rives, supIa note 1, at 77.

46.
47.
48.

Id.
NORVIR PETITION

Id. at 3-4.

2012, supra note 3, at 3.
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high drug prices. 9 After over a year of deliberations, the NIH denied
the march-in request. 50 This was the second such request made, and
5
denied, regarding ritonavir. 1
These organizations were seeking to use the unique statutory
mechanism of "march-in.' 25 As a reminder, the Bayh-Dole Act allows
research institutions to patent inventions that arise from federally
funded research. 5'3 Through the Act, the government retains the
right to "march-in."'
This means that the government can issue
licenses for the patented technology if patent-holders are not taking
reasonable steps to realize the public benefit of the federally funded
research." In theory at least, march-in would increase competition
(including generic competition in the pharmaceutical market), lower
prices, and allow follow-on innovation. 56
The NIH has received five petitions asking it to march-in, 57 and
each time the agency has declined?851 It has used the exact same
reasoning in responding to all five petitions. 5 ' The NIH engages in a
rigid interpretation of the march-in provision;" only considering
whether patent-holders are taking effective steps to achieve practical
application of an invention' and whether march-in would relieve
unfulfilled health and safety needs.62 If a drug is on the market, with
FDA approval, and being manufactured, that satisfies the "practical
application" element of the statute." Similarly, if a drug is FDA
approved, and being prescribed to treat patients, that satisfies the
"health and safety needs" element of the statute.
In its most recent determination, the NIH rejected the claims (1)

49. NoRVIR PETITION 2012, supra note 47, at 2-3.
50. NIH DETERMINATION, supra note 6, at 1.
51. See NORVIR PETITION 2004, supra note 7.
52. 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2012).
53. Id. § 202.
54. Id. § 203.
55. Id.
56. Rives, supra note 1, at 80.
57. Id. at 81.
58. Id.; NIH DETERMINATION, supra note 50.
59. Rives, supia note 1, at 88.
60. Id. at 88. In the 2012 request, petitioners also requested march-in under 35
U.S.C. § 203(a) (3). That provision of the statute deals with actions that are necessary
to comply with other Federal regulations. The NIH rejected that argument because
neither the Americans with Disabilities Act nor the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act require the use of Ritonavir. NIH DETERMINATION, supra note 50, at 5.
Analysis of this provision is outside the scope of this paper.
61. 35 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1) (2012).
62. Id. § 203(a) (2).
63. See, e.g., NIH DETERMINATION, supra note 50, at 4.

64. See, e.g., Id. at 4-5.
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that Abbott failed to achieve practical application of Norvir and (2)
that Abbott was failing to satisfy health and safety needs. 5 Norvir is
an FDA-approved drug, it is co-administered with other marketed
drugs, and there is no evidence that it is in short supply." There are
even Norvir-containing drugs provided through the President's
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief ("PEPFAR") and similar drugs in the
pipeline. 7 This "record of manufacture and ritonavir's availability
and use around the world demonstrate[d]" to NIH that Abbott was
achieving practical application of the invention."8 Regarding health
and safety needs, this same evidence indicates that Abbott is meeting
the demand for Norvir. The price of the drug is not increasing, and
there are patient assistant programs through which low-income
patients can access Norvir. 7° No information was provided to suggest
Abbott "has failed to 'reasonably satisfy' the health and safety need
standard of the Bayh-Dole march-in statute."7
In the earlier article, the author suggested that the government
should consider the purpose and objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act, and
give weight to the public's interest, when making a march-in
decision.7 2 Congress included march-in in the Bayh-Dole Act as a
safety valve to protect the public interest.73 Importantly, march-in was
intended to combat misuse of federally funded inventions where a
patent-holder was using a technology in a way that was antithetical to
public benefits. 74
For example, there is evidence that Abbott
increased the price of Norvir to preserve the position of another
product in the market.75 The company sought to limit use of Norvir
and thereby increase use of another product-which is directly
opposed to the goals of the Bayh-Dole Act.7"
The author suggested that federal research funding agencies, such
as the NIH, should consider two additional factors when weighing a
march-in decision: (1) are patent-holders acting consistent with the
purposes and objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act and (2) would march-in

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 4.
Id.
id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Rives, supra note 1, at 77-78.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 77-78.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 112-13.
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promote the public interest?77 If patent holders are not acting
consistent with the purposes of Bayh-Dole, this would indicate that
march-in is appropriate.
If march-in would not serve a public
interest, then march-in is probably not appropriate. The author also
described three possible avenues for implementing this new
approach. NIH could issue interpretive guidance elaborating a new
march-in approach;78 the Department of Commerce could revise its
regulations implementing Bayh-Dole; 79 or Congress could amend the
80
Act to announce this shift in march-in.
The NIH could, and still can, incorporate the Act's purpose and
objectives into future march-in decisions.8 ' However, especially based
on the recent NIH determination, it seems clear that the agency will
continue to apply the same decision-making framework. 2 There are
benefits to agency consistency; the community will know what to
expect from the agency when it makes future march-in
determinations. 3
Furthermore, courts tend to reward agency
consistency.8 4 The NIH would not want to have its march-in decision
overturned on judicial review, which makes it harder to deviate from
its previous decisions.
Therefore, if the government wants to adopt the author's
suggested march-in approach, Congress or the Department of
Commerce will have to act. The Department of Commerce should
revise the regulations implementing Bayh-Dole, reemphasizing that
agencies ought to consider the purpose and objectives of the Act
when deciding whether to initiate march-in proceedings. '
Congressional amendment of the Bayh-Dole Act would be the most
decisive way to reorient the march-in provision. 6 Congress can send
a clear signal to agencies like the NIH that march-in decisions should
be made in the context of Bayh-Dole's broader objective to promote
the public's interests.8 7
So far, the march-in provision has failed to be an effective safety
valve in the overall Bayh-Dole framework. It was intended to deter or

77. Id. at 101.
78. Id. at 106.
79. Id. at 110.
80. Id. at Ill.
81. Id. at 106.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See, e.g., NIH DETERMINATION, supra note 50.
See Rives, supra note 1, at 107-8.
See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
Rives, supIa note 1, at 110.
id. at Ill.

87. Id.

2014]

UPDATE: REORIENTING BAYH-DOLE'S MARCH-IN

195

correct misuse of federally funded technologies.88 The recent NIH
determination regarding ritonavir signals that the agency will not

shift the march-in process. This reemphasizes the argument from the
earlier paper and suggests we need to look to Congress or the
Department of Commerce to reorient the march-in provision and
ensure there is a viable safety valve in the Bayh-Dole Act to protect
the public's interest.

88.

Id. at 86-87.

